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LETTER DATED 9 JANUARY 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ETHIOPIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

In view of the Government of the Republic of Sudan's refusal to comply with repeated demands for extradition to Ethiopia of the terrorists sought for their role in the assassination attempt against President Mubarak of Egypt and the serious implications of such non-compliance, I have the honour to request in accordance with Article 35 of the Charter of the United Nations, an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the matter.

In this regard, I would like to refer to the meeting held between the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia and members of the Security Council on 21 December 1995. Information from my Government on the issue as well as the statements issued at the end of the 11 September and 19 December 1995 meetings of the Central Organ of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution are enclosed with this letter.

May I also ask for your kind assistance in distributing the present letter and the attached statements as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mulugeta ETEFFA
Permanent Representative

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Annex I

Statement issued on 11 September 1995 by the third extraordinary session of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, at the ministerial level on the assassination attempt on H.E. Hosni Mubarak, President of Egypt

Ministers of the countries members of the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, meeting in an extraordinary session on 11 September 1995, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; having listened to the comprehensive report on the outcome of the investigation conducted by the Ethiopian authorities into the terrorist assassination attempt on the life of H.E. President Hosni Mubarak, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, submitted by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia; and having also listened to the additional report on the same issue made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt; and having subsequently held a thorough exchange of views on the matter, at which time a number of delegations expressed their indignation:

1. EXPRESS their profound shock and indignation at the terrorist assassination attempt carried out on the life the President of Egypt, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 26 June 1995, and consider that attack as aimed not only at the Egyptian President and not only at the sovereignty, integrity and stability of Ethiopia, but also Africa as a whole;

2. EXPRESS further their profound relief that the President of Egypt was unharmed by this cowardly and heinous terrorist act;

3. COMMEND the Ethiopian authorities for the patience and effectiveness with which they have carried out the investigation into this terrorist act;

4. CONDEMN most vehemently the plot behind the terrorist assassination attempt on the life of the President of Egypt, which the Ethiopian authorities have uncovered and reported on to the Central Organ.

5. CONDEMN ALSO the flagrant violation of the sovereignty and integrity of Ethiopia and the attempt to disturb the peace and security of Ethiopia which the terrorist act on Ethiopian territory represented, and the attempt to inflict an irreparable damage on the Organization of African Unity and on Africa in general through targeting for assassination an African head of State who came to Addis Ababa to participate in an OAU summit;

6. CALL UPON the Government of the Sudan to hand over to Ethiopia the three terrorists who are sheltering in the Sudan on the basis of the 1964 Extradition Treaty between Ethiopia and the Sudan;

7. UNDERLINE the grave danger that terrorism, including State-sponsored terrorism, represents to regional and international peace and security and the need, therefore, for the international community to demonstrate full cooperation in the effort to eliminate this danger wherever it exists;

8. CALL FURTHER on all Governments, and in this case the Government of the Sudan, to desist from engaging in activities of assisting, supporting and facilitating terrorist activities and from giving shelter and sanctuaries to terrorist elements and to act in its relations with its neighbours and with others in full conformity with the Charters of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity and with principles of international law governing inter-State relations, most particularly in conformity with the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in October 1970, and with the Declaration on a Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations adopted by the thirtieth Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU in Tunis and all other pertinent resolutions of OAU.

9. REQUEST the Secretary-General, without prejudice to action that may be taken by Ethiopia and/or Egypt in accordance with the OAU Charter and consistent with international law, to submit a report to the next meeting of the Central Organ and the sixty-third ordinary session of the Council of Ministers of OAU on the extradition of the three terrorists referred to in paragraph 6 and on what additional measures are necessary to deal with the dangers posed by State-sponsored terrorism.

Annex II

Statement dated 19 December 1995 on the assassination attempt against H.E. President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt

The Central Organ considered the report of the Secretary-General on the follow-up to the decisions of the third extraordinary session of the Central Organ, at the ministerial level, relating to the assassination attempt on H.E. President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt.

After exhaustive discussions, during which the Central Organ listened to the statements made by the heads of delegation of Ethiopia, Egypt and the Sudan and the additional information they gave,

(a) It took note of the comprehensive document submitted by the head of the Ethiopian delegation and the statements made by the delegations of the Sudan and Egypt;

(b) It welcomed with satisfaction the efforts made by the Secretary-General to implement the relevant provisions of the statement of the Central Organ of 11 September 1995 (see annex I);

(c) It noted with regret that no progress had been made in the extradition by the Sudan of the three suspects found there:

1. The Central Organ strongly reaffirmed its conclusions and recommendations contained in its statement adopted on 11 September 1995 at its third extraordinary session and stressed the need for its full and urgent implementation.

2. It requested the Government of the Sudan to implement the said statement in all its aspects and cooperate with the OAU Secretary-General and the Central Organ for its implementation.

3. It urged the Sudanese Government to take the necessary measures to look for, locate and extradite the three terrorists.

4. The Central Organ decided to remain seized with the issue and requested the OAU Secretary-General to pursue his efforts for the implementation of the statement of 11 September 1995.

Annex III

Submission by Ethiopia to the United Nations Security Council on the assassination attempt on President Hosni Mubarak on 26 June 1995 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

(January 1996)

1. The issue that Ethiopia is presenting concerns the assassination attempt on the life of the President of Egypt on 26 June 1995 in Addis Ababa on the opening day of the thirty-first Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the Sudan's involvement in the matter.

2. The assassination attempt was made a few minutes after the arrival of the Egyptian President in Addis Ababa within a distance of less than a kilometre from the airport as he was being driven to the conference hall of the summit. Preparations for the terrorist ambush had taken almost two years.

3. It was a very sophisticated plot in which, subsequent investigations have shown, the security organs of the Sudan were involved. This is why we felt that the Security Council ought to be and should be seized with this very grave issue.

4. We are in fact bringing this matter to the Security Council very belatedly, six months after the commission of the crime and after our investigation into the terrorist crime had shown conclusively that Sudanese security organs and the leadership in the Sudan were involved in assisting, facilitating and supporting the assassination attempt on the life of the Egyptian President.

5. It took Ethiopia this long to come to the Security Council not because we felt that the matter did not warrant the very urgent attention and action of the Security Council. In fact, since the time when our investigation made clear Sudanese involvement, it has been our conviction that there was no greater crime and no more egregious gross violation of international law and of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, warranting the immediate attention of the Security Council, than this crime committed by the Government of the Sudan, which could have the potential of destabilizing the subregion with greater implications for international peace and stability.

6. But we did not come rushing to the Security Council immediately because we felt all bilateral means and then, should that fail, regional forums should be engaged and only then would it be necessary for the Security Council to be seized of the issue.

7. We tried the bilateral track to get the Sudanese Government to cooperate in handing over to Ethiopia, on the basis of the Treaty of Extradition between our two countries, the three terrorists being sheltered in the Sudan, one of whom escaped to Khartoum by Sudanese Airways within hours of the assassination attempt. But that was to no avail, and when it became clear that what the Sudanese Government wanted Ethiopia to do was to engage in a cover-up of the crime and the plot using a script prepared by the very same elements within the

Sudanese leadership who were in the first instance responsible for assisting, facilitating and supporting the terrorist attempt, Ethiopia felt it had no option but to take the matter to OAU, which it did on 11 September 1995. Here reference is made to the third extraordinary session of the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, which, after listening to the submissions to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Ethiopia and Egypt and after a comprehensive and exhaustive discussion on the item, adopted a statement which, first, commending the Ethiopian authorities for the patience and effectiveness with which they had carried out the investigation, among other things, condemned most vehemently the plot behind the terrorist assassination attempt on the life of the President of Egypt that the Ethiopian authorities had uncovered and "called upon the Government of the Sudan to hand over to Ethiopia the three terrorists who are sheltering in the Sudan on the basis of the 1964 Extradition Treaty between Ethiopia and the Sudan".

8. The statement also called on the Government of the Sudan, "to desist from engaging in activities of assisting, supporting and facilitating terrorist activities and from giving shelter and sanctuaries to terrorist elements and to act in its relations with its neighbours and with others in full conformity with the Charters of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity". Furthermore, affirming that the terrorist attack on President Mubarak should be seen not only as an attack on the Egyptian President and on the sovereignty, integrity and stability of Ethiopia, but also on Africa as a whole, the statement requested the Secretary-General of OAU, without prejudice to action that might be taken by Ethiopia and/or Egypt in accordance with the OAU Charter and consistent with international law, to submit a report to the next meeting of the Central Organ and the sixty-third ordinary session of the Council of Ministers.

9. Since the adoption of this statement by OAU, the Secretary-General of OAU has made efforts to approach the Sudanese Government, and as his report to the Ministerial Meeting of the Central Organ on Conflict Resolution, convened on 18 and 19 December 1995 in Addis Ababa, makes clear, the Sudanese authorities are determined to continue to prevaricate and to frustrate OAU's effort in the same way that they made sure that the bilateral efforts we made were frustrated.

10. Under the circumstances, the latest ministerial meeting of the Central Organ of OAU's Conflict Resolution Mechanism expressed "regret that no progress had been made in the extradition by the Sudan of the three suspects found there", and "strongly reaffirmed its conclusion contained in the statement adopted on 11 September 1995 ... and stressed the need for its full and urgent implementation".

11. This is why the matter is now before the United Nations. In view of the lack of progress at the bilateral and regional levels and because of Sudan's persistent refusal to cooperate, it is incumbent upon the Security Council to be seized with the matter and discharge its responsibility by taking appropriate action to address a terrorist act in which a State Member of the United Nations was deeply involved.

The assassination plot

12. What we are presenting is the result of patient, thorough and meticulous investigation into this terrorist action by the investigators of Ethiopia. Since Ethiopia was very keen in contributing to the fostering of mutual trust and confidence among the countries of our subregion, it was very hopeful that the outcome of the investigation would be different. Naturally, for a leadership that had just assumed power in a country whose peoples have suffered and bled for three decades because of war and man-made disasters, there was no priority more important than working for peace and cooperation in its own subregion, which includes the Sudan. Therefore, Ethiopia had absolutely no motive and no predisposition at the beginning of the investigation to prejudge or prejudice its outcome. We followed the facts where they led us and it is the truth that has pointed its finger at Sudan. Doing less than allowing the facts to speak for themselves would have meant for us engaging in a cover-up which, in our view, would be no less a crime than the actual commission of the criminal act itself.

13. It is therefore to those facts that we should turn and to the presentation of the results of the investigation that the relevant Ethiopian authorities have unearthed, which are based on human and material evidence, including statements made before court by the three terrorists who are fortunately in our custody.

14. Our investigation has confirmed that the terrorists who staged the attack on the life of President Mubarak on 26 June 1995 were members of Al-Gama'a-Islamia. Eleven operatives were deployed by the terrorist organization for carrying out the terrorist act. They were divided into two groups. The main leadership of the squad, consisting of two terrorists, was based in Khartoum. It was this group of two terrorists, ensconced in Khartoum, which took the responsibility of planning, following up and assuming overall control of the operation, from the beginning to the end. The two are Ibrahim, whose real name is Mustafa Hamza, and Izat, whose real name we have yet to find, but who is known in his own terrorist circle and in the Sudan by this fictitious first name.

15. These two leaders of the terrorist squad were not in Addis Ababa on the day of the assassination attempt but both had visited our capital in early 1994 in preparation for the assassination, an act that was decided upon immediately following the OAU Cairo summit in June 1993, at which Ethiopia's offer to host the thirty-first OAU summit in June 1995 was accepted by acclamation.

16. According to one of the terrorists in our custody, Mustafa Hamza had come to Addis Ababa in early 1994 with another terrorist for reconnaissance purposes and to decide on the suitability of Addis Ababa for staging the terrorist act. Immediately following his return to the Sudan the other terrorists making up the second group, composed of nine terrorists who were given specific tasks, were sent to Addis Ababa at different intervals.

17. Of the nine terrorists who were deployed in Addis Ababa to carry out the assassination attempt against President Mubarak, the first to arrive in 1994 were two. One of them, who is now in our custody, is Safwat Hassan Abdel Gani Atiq, who entered Addis Ababa using a Sudanese passport

under an assumed name of Faisal Mahmoud Ahmed Idris. The second person was the notorious Siraj or Fathi, who entered Ethiopia for the first time in early 1994 with Mustafa Hamza and left our capital a few hours after the failed assassination attempt on 26 June 1995, using a Sudanese passport under the fictitious name Faisal Lutfi Abdelatif. His true name is Husayn Ahmed Shahit' Ali.

18. These two terrorists, Safwat or Faisal and Siraj or Husayn, who came to Addis Ababa in mid-1994, in the case of Siraj for the second time, were given the specific task of preparing the ground for the arrival of the other seven terrorists in the group of nine, which included renting houses, and receiving the weapons and explosives sent from Khartoum to Addis Ababa by Sudan Airways.

19. Siraj was the most versatile and obviously closer to the leadership of the terrorist group. There are many indications that he had close contacts with the Sudanese Embassy in Addis Ababa and with a few Ethiopians who had earlier been taken to Khartoum for indoctrination and who returned to Addis Ababa to carry out missions given to them by the National Islamic Front, which is the major force behind the Government in the Sudan. One such Ethiopian who was recruited by the National Islamic Front and who worked very closely with Siraj was Shiek Said Mohammed.

20. Siraj and Faisal, as the advance party of the terrorist group, had been given instructions by Mustafa Hamza in Khartoum to try to establish Faisal in Addis Ababa as a businessman dealing with auto parts and as a respectable gentleman with an Ethiopian wife. The criminally motivated marriage was arranged for Faisal by Siraj and the Ethiopian National Islamic Front recruit, Shiek Saud Mohammed, with a young Ethiopian girl called Abeba Siraj. Abeba's sister, whose name is Kawsar Siraj, was recruited by the National Islamic Front in March-April 1993 and taken to Khartoum and is at present working at a hostel at the National Islamic Front-controlled African International University in Khartoum. Abeba, the Ethiopian wife of Faisal, admits to have accompanied her husband once to Khartoum and, according to her husband as well, they were received at Khartoum airport upon their arrival by Mustafa Hamza, along with her sister. The trip was arranged upon the request of Mustafa Hamza to save the marriage, which was threatening to break up before the terrorist mission was carried out for whose facilitation the marriage had been consummated. Abeba, the wife, was threatening to leave Faisal because of frustration at the secrecy surrounding her life and at the isolation imposed on her. All the more so because she could not have access to some of the rooms in her own house because weapons were kept by her husband in those rooms. During their one-month stay in Khartoum, Abeba discloses that she and her husband stayed in Mustafa Hamza's residence.

21. It was soon after Faisal and Siraj arrived in Addis Ababa and before a wife had been found for Faisal and before he had moved out from a hotel into a rented house that, according to Faisal himself, a box containing weapons and explosives for the assassination attempt was sent from Khartoum and delivered to Siraj or to someone he sent to collect the box from, in his words, "outside the Sudanese Airways office in front of the Maskel Square". That the weapons were flown in by Sudanese Airways is beyond doubt and that they were shipped from Khartoum is also clear from statements given by Faisal. Our investigators were later to

discover in a safehouse used by the terrorists the shipping box with a label giving the addressee as the Sudan's General Security Bureau.

22. After the return to Addis Ababa in December 1994 of Faisal and his wife from their one-month trip to Khartoum, events start to move faster and other terrorists, including Omar (true name Sharif Abd-Al Rahman Tawfiq Al Madani), start arriving in Addis Ababa. Omar was the leader of the operation in Addis Ababa and he assumed command immediately upon his arrival, parcelling out information and assignments to each participant on a strictly defined need-to-know basis. Those in custody make it clear that curiosity was not tolerated in the organization and people did what they were told and nobody asked where colleagues went to or came from.

23. Next to come from Khartoum to Addis Ababa were two more terrorists. Yassin, who is in custody, and Ihab. Ihab was killed on 1 July along with Omar and with another terrorist called Hamza, in a shoot-out with the Ethiopian Security five days after the assassination attempt at a safehouse rented for the group by Faisal.

24. Yassin, who has confessed as having taken a major part in the attempt, as he was to be responsible for detonating the powerful explosives he kept in a briefcase at President Mubarak's car, recounts in vivid detail how he and others came to Khartoum from Pakistan and how in Khartoum some of them worked at a farm established by his organization and located on the southern outskirts of Khartoum within the Soba area. In this context, Yassin has given specific details to our investigators on where in Khartoum he and other terrorists stayed.

25. Yassin and Ihab came to Addis Ababa from Khartoum in early 1995 and, after a very brief stay in our capital, went back to Khartoum, but this time by car, through Gonder, an Ethiopian provincial capital close to the Sudan, and Metema, a small Ethiopian town on the border with the Sudan. Yassin admits that this was a rehearsal to familiarize themselves with the escape route. Yassin found the rehearsal useful although he was unsuccessful. He was apprehended after the assassination attempt on his way to the Sudan, trying to retrace the rehearsed route.

26. The plan for the assassination attempt, although foiled, was rather well organized and the terrorists had all the necessary weapons they needed, including two RPGs (light recoilless anti-tank gun) with four shells, Kalashnikov assault rifles and, as was indicated earlier, a very sophisticated explosive device in a briefcase meant to be used for totally demolishing President Mubarak's vehicle.

27. Although the terrorists had rented a variety of houses in different parts of the city, two among these were chosen to stage the assault; both were conveniently located very close to the airport and to the highway linking the airport to the city centre.

28. The first house, only 70 or so metres from the highway, linked to it by a narrow alleyway, was the major staging point where six terrorists - Omar, Ihab, Hamza, Yassin, Turki and Mohammed - spend the night on the eve of the attempt.

29. The second house, a one-storey apartment building overlooking the airport and the highway, strategically located to provide a clear view of the airport through its rear window, was used to monitor activities at the airport. Siraj and Khalifa were stationed there and they were assigned to transmit messages on the movement of President Mubarak's motorcade by radio communication.

30. According to Yassin, the assassination attempt was to be carried out according to the following plan:

(a) Ihab, driving a Toyota Landcruiser, and Mohammed, in a Volvo car, were to block the highway to the approaching Mubarak motorcade;

(b) The remaining four, with Omar behind the wheel, were to follow in another car with the purpose of opening fire at President Mubarak's car and those of his entourage and, with Omar providing cover, Yassin was assigned to detonate the explosives in the black briefcase he was holding, in what appears to be a suicide mission, as he approached President Mubarak's car.

31. The meticulous plan failed to be carried out fully because the terrorists were met with the quick reaction of our security and police personnel and because, when the third car, which was supposed to follow the first two, failed to start, the four terrorists were unable to take advantage provided by the blocked highway. In any case, since Ihab had blocked the highway too soon before President Mubarak's motorcade was close enough to the target spot, there was enough opportunity for the motorcade to stop and make a U-turn, short of the danger zone.

32. In the ensuing mêlée, two Ethiopians, one from the defence forces and the second a policeman, laid down their lives in the effort to thwart the terrorists. During the attack two of the terrorists rushing towards the motorcade were gunned down by our snipers. The rest, Omar and Yassin as well as Ihab and Hamza, the latter two nursing wounds inflicted on them by our security personnel, escaped from the scene and proceeded to a safehouse in the eastern part of the city where on 1 July, that is five days later, Omar, Hamza and Ihab were killed after a shoot-out with our security personnel. Yasin was captured a few days later on his way to the Sudan while retracing the escape route for which he had rehearsed earlier. So was Khalifa. Faisal, the man with the Ethiopian wife whose mission was limited to fulfilling routine duties and mostly used as errand boy was captured in Addis Ababa.

33. Siraj, the man with contacts with the Sudanese Embassy in Addis Ababa, escaped within hours of the assassination attempt by Sudan Airways, which left Addis Ababa much later than its scheduled departure time.

34. Siraj's embarkation card is in our possession, so is the flight manifest, in both of which he has used the name Faisal Lutfi Abdelatif, a name he uses on his Sudanese passport.

35. We admit we do not have a letter from the Sudanese leaders with their signature affixed thereon giving instructions to the terrorists to carry out the assassination attempt. But short of that, we feel we have a strong case that should impel the Security Council to inscribe this issue on its agenda with a

view to the adoption of the necessary resolution that the Sudan hand over to Ethiopia those three terrorists who are being sheltered in the Sudan.

36. For us, the involvement of the Sudan and its security organs in the assassination attempt is not a matter of dispute. Apart from the shipping box, all the evidence gathered in the course of the investigation clearly and strongly indicated that the Sudanese Security and the Sudanese Government were deeply involved up to their necks in the plot.

37. All the three terrorists in our custody confirm that there were only three countries they had recently been to: Pakistan, the Sudan and Ethiopia. Pakistan is the country where they resided and in which most of them have been recruited. The Sudan is the base, while Addis Ababa is the scene of the crime. The only other countries mentioned by the terrorists are Saudi Arabia and once Kenya, but in these instances the two countries were visited in transit. In the Sudan, the terrorists in our custody admit to having worked at a farm managed by their organization; that their leaders live in Khartoum; that the plot was hatched in Khartoum; that their mission to assassinate President Mubarak was given to them in Khartoum; and that the weapons intended to be used in their mission were flown into Addis Ababa by Sudan Airways from Khartoum.

38. Moreover, the passports they possess, in virtually all cases, were prepared for them in Khartoum and at least six of them were given Yemeni passports, while the rest had Sudanese.

Efforts at extradition

39. The Ethiopian Government had all the evidence referred to within two weeks or less of the assassination attempt. But we chose not to make it public, choosing instead to approach the Sudanese with an appeal to hand over the three terrorists that they were sheltering, providing all the necessary information we managed to secure regarding the locations of the places they were sheltered in. This was done in a message of 25 July 1995, sent to the Sudanese President by the then President, now Prime Minister of Ethiopia. The response initially was not very discouraging, for what Ethiopia was given to understand was that they needed more time for such an action given the clout wielded by those who protect the terrorists. Appeals were made to Ethiopia in the name of the friendship between our two countries to withhold the information so that they might have more time to sort out their own internal bickering on whether or not to hand over the terrorists.

40. A little while later, in what was intended to be a thinly disguised attempt at evading the real issue, which we took as little more than a charade and a gimmick, it was announced by Khartoum that their Chief of External Security was removed as was their Minister of Internal Affairs and a few others.

41. But it was clear to us that all these were intended to be baits for us to oblige the Sudanese in a cover-up scheme, the script for which was being written by those same Sudanese extremist elements of the National Islamic Front who were responsible for assisting and encouraging the assassination attempt. Nor could we have been encouraged by the statements of people in the Sudan, some of whom wield enormous influence in the country. One such statement is attributed to

Hassan Al-Turabi by the Sudan News Agency on 3 July 1995. The News Agency cites Mr. Turabi as having said that "Egypt is experiencing now a religious drought. Allah the Almighty wanted the Islam revival to start from the Sudan and Islam will flow to them with the water of the Nile to purge Egypt". The agency went on to state that Mr. Turabi said that "The pharaoh of Egypt returned full of fright from Addis Ababa after he had been confronted by the mujahedin" and that "Mujahedin spring from the land of Egypt to pursue the pharaoh wherever he goes".

42. This did not surprise us at all because we have been used to the unimaginable and incredible hubris of some within the Sudanese leadership who continue to believe seriously that the Sudan is the centre of the world.

43. Those who have followed Ethio-Sudanese relations closely since the change of Government in Ethiopia more than four years ago should know full well how much Ethiopia has gone an extra mile to keep our relations with the Sudan on an even keel and how much, though our respective approaches to politics were different, we tried to maintain friendship between us, not only at the level of peoples-to-peoples relations, but also at the level of Governments. In fact, the Sudan's current political orientations have never been major preoccupations for us and we never felt that those would be impediments to friendship between our two countries. The authorities in the Sudan know how much we tried to stand on their side so that they may not be isolated internationally. In short, we were their true friends; and they stabbed us in the back.

44. It was Ethiopia that took the initiative immediately following the establishment of our new Government four years ago to waive visa requirements for citizens of the Sudan who wished to come to Ethiopia. We never felt that the Sudan's political orientation made that initiative unwise. Some said we were naive, but we thought friendship should accommodate differences in political positions, no matter how diametrically opposed those positions might be. Although this episode has pained us, we are convinced that it is the Sudan that lost a friend, because our friendship for the Sudan was genuine. It is the assassination attempt on the life of President Mubarak in our very capital that changed our attitude. It should again be emphasized here that our changed attitude has nothing to do with the Sudan's Islamic orientation; it has nothing to do with the human rights issues of which the Sudan has often been accused. It is rather the act of terrorism that they encouraged and assisted in our capital that must be taken as an indirect aggression against Ethiopia, which made us come here to the Security Council and earlier to OAU.

45. Even then, we have tried virtually everything possible to sort out the problem bilaterally, and it was only when this track led to a dead end that we took the matter to OAU.

46. When OAU began to look into the issue, the Sudan resisted vigorously, claiming that the matter was political in nature and as such could not be dealt with by the OAU Conflict Prevention Mechanism. Now that Ethiopia has brought the matter to the United Nations, the Sudanese have changed their tune, insisting that only OAU deal with the issue. If there was a higher forum above the Security Council to which Ethiopia could go, no doubt the Sudan would demand that only the Security Council deal with the matter at hand. All we have seen

in the last six months are delaying tactics employed by Khartoum in a desperate effort to avoid facing the damning facts.

47. Efforts to settle the matter under the auspices of the OAU Central Organ have been made and fully exhausted, and as far as Ethiopia is concerned there is no basis or need for delaying implementation of the Central Organ's decisions in the pretext of making additional efforts at the regional level.

48. The Sudan's assertion that OAU has not exhausted its efforts is totally baseless and represents yet another futile attempt to undermine the decisions of the OAU Central Organ and to buy time in order to cover up its role in international terrorism and to prevent the Security Council from fulfilling its responsibility of combating terrorism, which is an essential element for the maintenance of international peace and security.

49. Action by the Security Council on the matter presented to it by Ethiopia will not in any manner whatsoever undermine OAU; rather it will enforce the latter's credibility and legality of its decisions, thereby setting in motion the desired cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security.

50. The authorities in the Sudan will leave no stone unturned to avoid having to deal with the substance of the accusations they face. In their work of obfuscation, they are trying to portray that Ethiopia is serving the interests of others. This is not in line with our history or with our psychology. We may be poor but we have our dignity. Never would Ethiopia be a Trojan horse for others. But the Sudanese Government has no other option than to say this because their own authorities know that the present Government of Ethiopia would never accuse the Sudan without cause.

51. For Ethiopia, peaceful and friendly relations with its neighbours, including the Sudan, are a cherished objective. But we cannot pretend the evidence and the facts away. States that can allow themselves to be engaged in sponsoring acts of terrorism must be held to account. The Security Council cannot give a blind eye to this.

52. Although thankfully the assassination attempt was foiled, we should consider what could have resulted had it succeeded. The relations between the countries of the subregion - Ethiopia, the Sudan and Egypt among them - are well known. Would countries have been able to restrain themselves had President Mubarak been assassinated? And what would that have meant to regional peace and security? And what are the implications if the extremists in the Sudan were to be let off the hook by our looking the other way today? The effect of assassinations on triggering off terrible conflicts is well known. Despite the existence of underlying causes, it cannot be forgotten that the sufferings caused in Rwanda and Burundi were triggered off by an act of assassination.

53. To come to the matter before us, the State-sponsored terrorist act that was played out in our capital on 26 June 1995, was in many ways an indirect aggression against Ethiopia. But what we are asking in response to this is for the Security Council to assume its responsibility by putting pressure on the

Sudanese Government so that that Government will do one very simple thing: hand over to Ethiopia those three terrorists who are now being sheltered in the Sudan. We have in accordance with Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations tried to do our level best to resolve this dispute. But to no avail. The regional efforts through OAU have achieved no results. Indeed OAU is frustrated by Sudanese intransigence. It is time that OAU is assisted by the international community as a whole. The fact that the matter is still on the agenda of the OAU Central Organ demonstrates the interest of OAU in the follow-up of the full and prompt implementation of its decisions. The fact that it remains seized of the issue should not prevent the Security Council from considering the matter with a view to taking the appropriate course of action consistent with its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

54. Furthermore, the issue cannot be seen merely as a dispute between two or three countries. The assassination attempt on the life of the Egyptian President was also aimed at OAU and the criminal act, if it had succeeded, would no doubt have had incalculable implications for regional and international peace and security. In this regard, the Charter of OAU in its article III says that member States "unreservedly condemn in all its forms, political assassination ..." Furthermore, the international community, including members of our Organization, have entered into a firm commitment, through United Nations declarations and conventions, to oppose terrorism and not to tolerate this evil. The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in November 1970 makes this clear in no uncertain terms.

55. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, which came into force in February 1977 makes "a violent attack upon the official premises, the private accommodation or the means of transport of an internationally protected person", including a head of State, an international crime.

56. The latest commitment entered into by the international community to fight against terrorism embodied in the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, adopted by the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session in 1994, also makes it abundantly clear that, "the suppression of acts of international terrorism including those in which States are directly or indirectly involved, is an essential element for the maintenance of international peace and security". The point is, State-sponsored terrorism cannot in this day and age be tolerated no matter who does it; and the international community is on record on this.

57. We call thus on the Security Council to consider the matter, inscribe this grave issue on its agenda and adopt a resolution commensurate with the gravity of the crime. Ethiopia and its peoples await your response.